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LET THE BUYER BEWARE: ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION,




Historically, politics, rather than scientific management or theory, has
dominated China's' economic policy.2 This struggle among competing
ideologies gave rise to erratic results and hindered China's economic
evolution.' Recent efforts to create an internationally competitive free
market economy, however, have coordinated economic change with legal
reform.4 Consequently, "[i]nstead of disintegrating into floods and fam-
ines, the former sick man of Asia is enjoying the fruits of the world's
latest economic miracle."5 While factors such as a population exceeding
one billion people, a weak infrastructure, and an uncertain political cli-
mate complicate this scheme,6 China's leaders are determined to modern-
ize a broad range of industries.7
Insurance' is one field in which China has demonstrated particular
interest.9 The state-owned People's Insurance Company of China
("PICC") currently dominates Chinese insurance;' 0 there is little domes-
tic competition" and foreign insurers are virtually non-existent." Com-
1. In this Note, "China" refers to the People's Republic of China, unless otherwise
noted.
2. See Paul D. Reynolds, China's International Banking and Financial System 1
(1982); infra part I.
3. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 1; infra part I.
4. See China Focuses on Banking Reform, Reuter Newswire, Sept. 11, 1993, avail-
able in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File; Li Yining, Legal Framework A Key Stage in Devel-
opment of Economy, South China Morning Post, Jan. 17, 1994, available in VESTLAW,
INT-NEWS File; Zhu Outlines Role for Foreign Insurance Firms in China, Lloyd's List,
Nov. 11, 1992, available in WESTLAV, INT-NEWS File.
5. Nicholas D. Kristof, China Sees "Market-Leninism" as Way to Future, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 6, 1993, at A5.
6. See Nai-Ruenn Chen & Jeffrey Lee, China's Economy and Foreign Trade 1981-
85, at 25 (1984); John J. Hampton, Insurance in China, CPCU I., June 1989, at 105; Liu
Hongru, Commentary: Developments in the Reform of China's Banking and Financial
Systems, 2 J. Chinese L. 323, 356 (1988).
7. See Michael D. Armacost, The People's Republic of China: Economic Reform.
Modernization and the Law, 3 China L. Rep. 153, 153 (1986); The Birth of A New Econ-
omy in China, Bus. Times, Jan. 26, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS File [herein-
after Birth of A New Economy].
8. Insurance is "a contract by which one party for a consideration assumes particu-
lar risks of the other party and promises to pay him.., a certain or ascertainable sum of
money on a specified contingency." 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 2, at 73 (1993).
9. See China Steps Up Legislation for Finance, Xinhua News, May 10, 1993, avail-
able in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File; John Kohut, Opening Seen for Insurers, South
China Morning Post, July 6, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEVS File.
10. See China Speeds Up Drafting of Insurance Law, Xinhua News, Nov. 30, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File [hereinafter China Speeds Drafting].
11. See John McLaughlin, Chinese Group Targets U.S.-The People's Insurance Com-
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pared to the insurance businesses of other economically developed
nations, China's industry is still in its infancy, controlled only by sparse
and skeletal legislation. 3 Nevertheless, as a necessary financial service,
insurance has become an indispensable link in China's economy.' 4
Despite its importance to the country's economy, the domestic insur-
ance market is fraught with peril for the Chinese consumer. Insurance is
less common in China than in Western Europe and the United States."5
Not only are individual Chinese consumers unlikely to be familiar with
the concept, but Chinese risk managers, who structure and purchase in-
surance programs for corporate entities, are inexperienced by interna-
tional standards. 16 Furthermore, the intangible nature of insurance is
such that a consumer cannot discern policy inadequacies, accidental or
otherwise, until a loss actually occurs. 7 In addition, purchasing secur-
ity from a commercial entity is novel in a culture built on collective social
units. 18
International forces also pose risks to Chinese consumers. Asian mar-
kets offer enormous potential for foreign expansion; by the year 2000,
Asia will encompass seven of the world's ten largest cities."' China alone
represents one of the largest international markets; 20 with a current an-
nual growth rate of approximately thirteen percent,2' it has the world's
fastest growing economy. 22 In addition, the globe's most populous na-
tion presents remarkable opportunity for economic expansion, 23 opportu-
nity which foreign insurers are eager to seize.24
pany of China, Lloyd's List, July 3, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File; Jim
Mulrenan, Competition for PICC to Start Next Month, Lloyd's List, Mar. 7, 1991, avail-
able in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File.
12. See David Batchelor, Solving the Chinese Puzzle, ReActions, Nov. 1990, at 46;
Mulrenan, supra note 11, at 14.
13. See Kate Mcllwaine, Region Offers Opportunities for Innovators, Broker Says,
Bus. Ins., Oct. 18, 1993, at 71; McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 46; Mulrenan, supra note
11, at 14.
14. See Wei Runquan, The Open Policy and Insurance Industry of China, Can. Un-
derwriter, May 1988, at 42.
15. Presently, insurance premiums per person in China is only 30 yuan; in the United
States and Japan, the same figure ranges as high as 2,000 U.S. dollars. See China Speeds
Drafting, supra note 10.
16. See George McGhie, The Challenge ofa Global Fit, The Review, Sept. 1, 1993, at
63.
17. See 1 James J. Lorimer et al., The Legal Environment of Insurance 29 (2d ed.
1981).
18. See Eric Lee, Commercial Dispute Settlement in China 7 (1985).
19. See McIlwaine, supra note 13, at 71.
20. See id.
21. See Birth of A New Economy, supra note 7; Tony Walker, Crucial Stage of the
Reform Programme, Fin. Times, Nov. 18, 1993, § III, III. In addition, China has sus-
tained a growth rate of at least eight to nine percent since 1978. See Edward Balls, The
Cage Opens and the Bird Learns to Fly, Fin. Times, Nov. 18, 1993, § I, I.
22. See Kristof, supra note 5, at A5.
23. See Philip Halliard, China's Calm Before the Storm, The Review, Nov. 1, 1993, at
18.
24. See Graeme Browning, If Everybody Bought One Shoe: American Capitalism in
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Consumer protection legislation, which shields consumer interests and
curtails aggressive company practices, could mitigate the risks of both
domestic and international competition. Provisions to this effect pres-
ently do not exist in China's insurance laws.25 Although current efforts
to modernize26 the industry incorporate legal reform,2" legislators may
overlook consumer protection. China intends modernization to attract
foreign capital and investment 28 and to strengthen the fledgling domestic
industry.29 Discussion of insurance reform tends to center on these
goals, rather than on consumer or marketing issues.3" Because there is
little Chinese or Asian law upon which to base such provisions, Ameri-
can codes could provide a model for this reform. 3
This Note suggests that, in order for the insurance industry to fulfill
the role envisioned for it by the government, Chinese consumers must
feel secure from misrepresentation and overreaching in their insurance
transactions. Part I chronicles China's economic history. Part II de-
scribes trends shaping current economic reform efforts. Part III exam-
ines China's insurance industry, its history and governing legislation.
Part IV discusses the adequacy of this legislation, specifically with re-
spect to market regulation and consumer protection. Part V suggests
that China adopt legislation analogous to the Model Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act of the American National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners ("NAIC") as a solution to the consumer protection issues raised
in Part IV. This Note concludes that the scope of China's current legal
and economic reform necessitates and justifies the adoption of consumer
protection legislation analogous to the NAIC Model Act. Because such
provisions would be simply a new application of restrictions familiar to
global insurers, many of whom also operate in the United States, they
would not impair the growth of the Chinese market.
I. CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM HISTORY
China is one of the oldest civilizations in the world and has the oldest
Communist China 6-7 (1989); See Jin Cao, Comment, Major Legal Aspects of Foreign
Investment in the People's Republic of China, 4 Conn. J. Int'l L. 185, 185 (1988).
25. See Provisional Regulations Governing Insurance Enterprises (March 3, 1985) in
2 Commercial Business and Trade Laws: People's Republic of China 107 (Owen D. Nee,
Jr. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Regulations].
26. See Kent Chen, Insurance Firms Set to Gain from Market Reforms, South China
Morning Post, Nov. 16, 1993, available in WESTLA\V, INT-NEWS File Deputy Gover-
nor of the People's Bank of China Speaks Out, Ins. Res. Letter, Sept. 1993 [hereinafter
Deputy Governor Speaks Out]; Government to Enact More Laws on Economy in Next Five
Years, Xinhua News, Mar. 17, 1991, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File.
27. See Chen, supra note 26; Deputy Governor Speaks Out, supra note 26.
28. See China Focuses on Banking Reform, Reuter Newswire, Sept. 11, 1993, avail-
able in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File.
29. See Chen, supra note 26.
30. See idL
31. See Model Unfair Trade Practices Act, 4 N.A.I.C. Model Laws, Regulations and
Guidelines at 880-15 to 800-18 (1984 & 1993 update) [hereinafter "Model Act"].
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continuous culture.32 Despite this continuity, China has not attained the
economic rank and development of its Asian neighbors such as Japan,
the economic powerhouse of Asia,33 or South Korea, Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, and Singapore, the "Four Tigers" currently challenging Japan's re-
gional economic dominance.34 Economic development long has been a
goal of modem China; poverty was a motivating force of the Chinese
Communist Revolution and economic reform one of its central objec-
tives.3 5 Since the Communist victory in 1949, however, overzealous pro-
grams and misguided ideological campaigns have rendered success
elusive. Not until 1978,36 and the implementation of programs such as
the Four Modernizations and the Open Door Policy, did China sustain
the stability and momentum necessary for economic modernization.
As a result of its victory over Nationalist forces, the Chinese Commu-
nist Party ("CCP"), led by Mao Zedong, a7 inherited an economy histori-
cally ravaged by foreign encroachments and debilitated by protracted
international and civil warfare.38 For example, Great Britain's imperial-
ist treatment of China culminated in the Opium War, which lasted from
1839 to 1842.39 A series of "Unequal Treaties" secured British victory in
this conflict.' These treaties established British "concessions" in five
Chinese cities which enabled them to conduct foreign trade and to estab-
lish self-governing communities.4" In addition, the Treaty of Nanjing
forced China to cede Hong Kong to Great Britain.42
Western Europe and Japan also exploited China and its citizens, fur-
ther exacerbating the anti-foreign sentiment which British actions had
inspired.43 In 1898, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Russia joined
forces to compel the Qing government to grant them "spheres of influ-
ence" in selected regions of the country." In 1890, the United States and
Japan joined these nations to retaliate against government-encouraged,
anti-foreign mobs in the Boxer Rebellion.45 Resolution of this conflict
cost China huge indemnities, as well as national pride.46
32. See 9 Modem Legal Systems Cyclopedia 9.300.7 (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1990)
[hereinafter Cyclopedia].
33. See McGhie, supra note 16, at 63.
34. See id.; Int'l Ins. Rep., July 1989, at 8; Kristof, supra note 5, at A5.
35. See Craig Dietrich, People's China: A Brief History 3-4 (1986).
36. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 2-3.
37. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 32.
38. See Cyclopedia, supra note 32, at 9.300.12; Albert Feuerworker, Relating to the
International Community in China's Developmental Experience 42, 49 (Michel Ok-
senberg ed., 1973); Philip Wik, How to do Business with the People's Republic of China 5
(1984).
39. See Wik, supra note 38, at 2.
40. See id. at 2.
41. See id. at 2, 20.
42. See id. at 2.
43. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 19-22; supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
44. See id. at 20.




Japan alone exerted imperialist aggressions more than once during
China's pre-Communist history. Following the Sino-Japanese War in
1895, Japan imposed a huge indemnity upon China and forced it to relin-
quish control of Taiwan.47 Furthermore, Japan sustained a period of ag-
gression against China which lead to invasion in 1937.4
In addition to the repercussions of imperialist encroachments, continu-
ous warfare hindered China's economic development. The decline in de-
mand for Chinese products which followed World War I adversely
impacted the domestic economy. 49 Moreover, years of internal and ex-
ternal warfare produced hyper-inflation, agricultural and industrial stag-
nation, capital flight, and massive unemployment.5"
To remedy these conditions, the CCP commenced reform5 based ini-
tially on two main principles. First, it transformed the Chinese economy
into a publicly owned and planned system52 built around the communist
party, a model based on the Soviet revolutionary experience.53 This
transformation resulted in CCP control over monetary, fiscal, and trade
systems.54 It also incorporated government expropriation of enterprises,
industries, and banks formerly owned by capitalists and Nationalists."
Second, the CCP espoused a philosophy of "austere self reliance,"56 re-
jecting foreign aid and influence. Both basic Communist policy57 and the
deeply rooted xenophobia inspired by memories of foreign exploitation
fostered this isolationism.5" Together, these principles effectively closed
the Chinese market to foreigners regardless of their political ideology. 59
Reform under these polices generated inconsistant results. Rehabilita-
tion implemented immediately following the founding of the People's Re-
public of China ("PRC") established a communist system and began to
reverse the nation's prior economic devastation.' ° The years from 1949
to 1952 were arguably the CCP's most successful; 6 the Party controlled
47. See id. at 20.
48. See i. at 25-26.
49. See id. at 22.
50. See i. at 55.
51. See id.; Benjamin Schwartz, China's Developmental Experience, 1949-72, in
China's Developmental Experience 17, 18 (Michel Oksenberg ed., 1973).
52. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 55-56.
53. See id. at 56; Schwartz, supra note 51, at 19; Wik, supra note 38, at 5.
54. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 55-56; Wik, supra note 38, at 6.
55. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 55-56; Wik, supra note 38, at 6.
56. Sang Bin Xue & George D. Wilson, Capital and Technology China Rejoins the
Modern Business World-An Analysis of China's Equity Joint Ventures Law, 25 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 511, 514 (1991).
57. See id. at 513. Foreign aid or cooperation is antithetical to Communism. See id.
at 513-14.
58. See id.; Armacost, supra note 7, at 154-55; Wik, supra note 38, at 2-3; supra notes
39-48 and accompanying text.
59. See Sang Bin Xue & George D. Wilson, supra note 56, at 514.
60. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 55, 79; Christopher Howe, China's Economy: A
Basic Guide at xxii (1978).
61. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 79.
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inflation and achieved state control over industry.62 The CCP capital-
ized on this progress with the First Five Year Plan.63 Spanning the years
1953 to 1957, the Plan emphasized industrialization and agrarian collec-
tivism,6' and permitted some 'opening' to Soviet influence. 6 Results of
the First Five Year Plan and its accompanying Soviet assistance were
"very good."'66 Annual growth in heavy industry sectors reached eight-
een percent and the national economy grew at an annual rate of ten per-
cent.67 The CCP also successfully established agricultural cooperatives,
nationalized industry, and augmented central planning capabilities. 68
The Second Five Year Plan, however, yielded vastly different results.69
Despite the progress of the First Five Year Plan, CCP leaders confronted
a variety of problems during the last half of 1957.70 Agriculture was the
chief economic issue," specifically whether China both could sustain
high industrial growth and spur agricultural output.7 2 The Great Leap
Forward, the CCP's solution to these problems, was a "leftward drift in
both ideology and economic policy," intended "to achieve almost over-
night economic modernization."73 Despite its aims, The Great Leap
Forward was an undisputed "economic catastrophe," '74 with effects
"comparable in scale [and scope] to a major depression." 75
To compensate for this debacle, the PRC used the early 1960s as a
period of "readjustment."'76 Pragmatists within the nation's leadership
shifted their emphasis from ideology to production in an effort to restore
economic progress.77 As a result of this change in policy, China reduced
foreign debt, achieved a trade surplus with the Soviets, and obtained
technological assistance from Japan, Italy, West Germany, and Great
Britain.78 Mao Zedong, however, criticized such "corrupting capitalist
influences" and urged revolutionary change.79 Despite the failure of his
62. See id. at 55-56. The CCP also exerted government control over social issues like
crime and education. See id. at 56.
63. See id. at 84.
64. See Cyclopedia, supra note 32, at 9.300.12.
65. See Robert Kleinberg, China's Opening to the Outside World: The Experiment
with Foreign Capitalism 8 (1990).
66. Dietrich, supra note 35, at 111.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Cyclopedia, supra note 32, at 9.300.13.
70. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 110.
71. See id. at 114.
72. See id. at 110. Problems also existed in a number of other areas. For instance,
dissent brewed within the domestic intellectual community, a rift existed among CCP
leadership, and foreign relations with both Western and communist nations were prob-
lematic. See id. at 112-14.
73. Cyclopedia, supra note 32, at 9.300.13.
74. Id.; Howe, supra note 60, at xxii; see Wik, supra note 36, at 7.
75. Dietrich, supra note 35, at 141.
76. See Howe, supra note 60, at xxx.
77. See Cyclopedia, supra note 32, at 9.300.13.




Great Leap Forward, his urgings catalyzed The Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution.8"
The Cultural Revolution, which spanned the years from 1966 to 1968,
represented China's "dark age.""1 The movement was not an economic
program, but rather a political struggle which "pushed the concern with
economic development to the sidelines." 82 According to Mao, its princi-
pal architect, the Cultural Revolution was necessary "for consolidating
the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration, and
building socialism."83 But implementing these plans via peasant cru-
sades, student brigades, and kangaroo courts constituted more an ex-
treme and violent campaign against Mao's personal enemies than a
national social reformation. 4
Despite its social and political focus, the Cultural Revolution had
devestating economic repurcussions. 5 Factories closed 6 and industrial
output declined. Tentatively renewed trade efforts either ceased,88 or
their means of implementation were destroyed. 9 Corrupt and unedu-
cated individuals took charge of the nation's governing and manufactur-
ing entities, living standards plummeted, and mass starvation became a
grim reality.9" In short, "[t]he Cultural Revolution's legacy was a ram-
shackle economy."91
Mao finally urged an end to this chaos in 1968.92 His death in Septem-
ber 19769' cleared the way for renewed economic reform.' Pragmatists
again returned to power, recognized the limitations of China's isolation-
ism,95 and re-established ties with foreign nations and international orga-
nizations. 9 6 Officially, the Fifth-Five Year Plan endorsed these ideas97
and modernization in general.98 It also encouraged the importation of
foreign technology to "make foreign things serve China and achieve
greater, faster, better, and more economical results in building social-
80. See Cyclopedia, supra note 32, at 9.300.13.
81. See Chin Kim, The Modern Chinese Legal System, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1413, 1414
(1987).
82. Howe, supra note 60, at xxxi; see Schwartz, supra note 51, at 18.
83. Dietrich, supra note 35, at 201 (citing 4 The People's Republic of China, 1949-
1979: A Documentary Survey 224 (Harold C. Hinton ed., 1980)).
84. See Howe, supra note 60, at xxxi; Wik, supra note 38, at 9-10.
85. See Howe, supra note 60, at xxxi; Wik, supra note 38, at 10.
86. See John Byron & Robert Pack, The Claws of the Dragon: Kang Sheng-The
Evil Genius Behind Mao-and his Legacy of Terror in People's China 313 (1992).
87. See Howe, supra note 60, at xxxi.
88. See id.
89. See Byron & Pack, supra note 86, at 313.
90. See id.
91. Wik, supra note 38, at 10.
92. See id.
93. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 234.
94. See Howe, supra note 60, at xxxiii.
95. See iL
96. See Wik, supra note 38, at 11.




ism."9 9 China's current economic policies reflect these ideals.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM
Since 1978, China has reentered the global business community,1°°
opened itself to international transactions, and become the world's new-
est industrializing nation."° ' While past economic reforms oscillated
among competing political ideologies and domestic programs, 0 2 China's
current philosophy reflects a modernizing and expanding economy in-
creasingly tied to both Western and global economies.10 3 Two related
strategies comprise the roots of this transformation-The Four Modern-
izations and the Open Door Policy.
The Four Modernizations espoused the "goal of propelling China into
the front ranks by the year 2000."'1' Zhou Enlai originally enunciated
the concept at the Fourth National People's Congress in 1965,'" 5 but
both the Cultural Revolution and, later, his death, relegated it to the
sidelines. 106 By 1978, however, the need for innovative reform was clear;
past domestic performances had been disappointing and the prospects of
existing economic schemes were bleak.' 07 These conditions facilitated
the rebirth of the Four Modernizations.
Adopted in 1978 by the Eleventh Party Congress of the CCP,'0° the
Four Modernizations departed from previous reform models.' 0 9 The
strategy initially called for a long range plan to achieve the "moderniza-
tion of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technol-
ogy before the end of the century, so that [the] national economy [could]
... advanc[e] in the front ranks of the world."" 0  China shifted this
focus slightly in 1979 to emphasize light industry and export manufac-
turing over heavy industry." I Within the plan's target areas, the govern-
99. Kleinberg, supra note 65, at 24.
100. See Jin Cao, supra note 24, at 185
101. See Bruce Cumings, The Political Economy of China's Turn Outward, in China
and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations 203, 203 (Samuel S. Kim
ed., 1989).
102. See William R. Feeney, Chinese Policy Toward Multilateral Economic Institutions,
in China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations, 237, 237 (Samuel
S. Kim ed., 1989).
103. See id. at 257-58.
104. Wik, supra note 38, at 15; see Armacost, supra note 7, at 154; Eileen Donahoe,
Note, The Promise of Law for the Post-Mao Leadership in China, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 171,
173-74 n.14 (1988).
105. See Jan S. Prybyla, The Chinese Economy: Problems and Policies 7 (2d ed. rev.
1981); Lee, supra note 18, at 6.
106. See Lee, supra note 18, at 6-7.
107. See Feeney, supra note 102, at 239.
108. See Wik, supra note 38, at 15.
109. See Feeney, supra note 102, at 239.
110. Dietrich, supra note 35, at 226, (quoting 4 The People's Republic of China, 1949-
1979: A Documentary Survey 249 (Harold C. Hinton ed., 1980)); see Donahoe, supra
note 104, at 173-74 n.14; Reynolds, supra note 2, at 2.
111. See Cumings, supra note 101, at 211-12. This shift resulted from disappointing
[Vol. 622132
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ment would "combine state planning with market mechanisms and
achieve socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics."" ' 2
Hand-in-hand with China's internal reforms has come an opening of
its economy to the outside world.1 3 In conjunction with the target of
advanced industrialization, the Four Modernizations encouraged foreign
trade and foreign investment within China.' 4 The Open Door Policy,
adopted in February 1980,"1 departed sharply from both Communist
ideals and Chinese xenophobia." 6 Although some anti-foreign sentiment
remains, China has conceded the benefits of international cooperation," 7
finding that "[iun the shrinking and increasingly interdependent world,
no country is able to achieve modernization without active economic in-
teraction with other countries."". s
In furtherance of the Open Door Policy, China has endorsed three
related efforts. First, it has formally joined a number of international
financial programs. China has been an aid recipient of the United Na-
tions Development Program ("UNDP") since 1979.119 In 1980, it joined
both the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the World Bank. 2°
In addition, the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") admitted China in
1986. " ' Participation in such multilateral organizations has effectively
repudiated China's earlier self-reliance and committed it to "actively
seeking and utilizing extensive and long-term foreign borrowing and
trade and greatly expanded foreign involvement. '22
Second, China has opened its domestic markets to greater penetration
by foreigners. 123 The country welcomes international investors for con-
tributing needed capital and expertise to its economy. 124 Even multina-
tional corporations, which Chinese communists once criticized as
exploitative and capitalistic, may now operate within limits because of
the positive impact they can have on the economy of a developing coun-
domestic growth in oil and coal production. See id. at 210. The nation's abundant work
force and natural resources made labor intensive, "light" industries such as textiles more
practical than capital- and technology-intensive fields. See id. at 214.
112. Han Xu, Sino-American Economic Cooperation, 3 China L. Rep. 160, 160 (1986);
see Jin Cao, supra note 24, at 187; Kleinberg, supra note 65, at 6.
113. See Armacost, supra note 7, at 154.
114. See id.; Feeney, supra note 102, at 241.
115. See Feeney, supra note 102, at 241.
116. See id.; supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
117. See Sang Bin Xue & George D. Wilson, supra note 56, at 513-15.
118. Han Xu, supra note 112, at 160; see Kleinberg, supra note 65, at 23 (citations
omitted).
119. See Feeney, supra note 102, at 251. The UNDP is a voluntarily funded organiza-
tion that administers and coordinates most UN grants in the areas of advisory services,
demonstration and training equipment, and preinvestment planning and management
training for a broad range of fields in developing countries. See id.
120. See id. at 241.
121. See id. at 252. Members of the ADB are eligible for both ordinary loans and
concessional credits from the ADB. See id.
122. Id. at 241.
123. See Browning, supra note 24, at 6.
124. See Jin Cao, supra note 24, at 185-86; Kohut, supra note 9, at 2.
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try. 125 Companies such as Nike produce goods in China for export, Hon-
eywell and Hewlett-Packard design computer technologies for China's
textile industry, and American Motors manufactures jeeps in a Chinese-
American joint venture. 126 In addition to its pure economic benefits,
such cooperation strengthens China's ties within the international busi-
ness community. 127
Third, the PRC has expanded and expedited both the reform and the
creation of law applicable to foreign investments.' 28 China's legal cli-
mate has been unpredictable since 1948.129 When the CCP gained
power, it abolished the nation's preexisting legal codes, but failed to sub-
stitute new law in their place."s Rather, the CCP "ruled in an arbitrary
and essentially 'lawless' way."' 3 1 Since 1976, however, China has em-
barked on the path to legal reform to foster foreign investment as well as
political stability. 132 The first manifestation of this effort came in 1979
with passage of The Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese
Foreign Joint Ventures. 133 China next adopted a modern Constitution in
1982,'13 and from 1982-86, created over one hundred specialized
economic laws and regulations, 135 many of which are the first of their
kind in China.'3 6 Legal refrom has become so important to China's eco-
nomic reform that commentators have designated it a "Fifth
Modernization."137
125. See Cumings, supra note 101, at 215; Jin Cao, supra note 24, at 187.
126. See id.
127. See Andrew Browne, China Confident on U.S. Trade, Plans Tariff Cuts, Reuter
Newswire, Nov. 22, 1992, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File.
128. See Chen, supra note 26.
129. See Victor H. Li, Law Without Lawyers: A Comparative View of Law in China
and the United States 14 (1978).
130. See Andrew Mayer, The Rocky Road to Democracy: A Few Comments on Legal
Developments in China Since the Cultural Revolution, 6 China L. Rep. 1, 1 (1989).
131. See id. (quoting J. Cooper et. al., Human Rights in Post-Mao China 41 (1985)).
From 1954 to mid-1957, China did experience a period of legal development. This pro-
gress was interrupted, however, by the continuous social upheaval that characterized
China's development from 1957 until 1966. See Chin Kim, supra note 81, at 1414. Fur-
thermore, commercial law in general is scarce in centrally planned economies. See Rich-
ard B. Schmitt, Calling U.S. Lawyers Exploiters, Russians Seek to Reign Them In, Wall
St. J., Jan. 17, 1994, at BI.
132. See Mayer, supra note 130, at 1-3.
133. See Jin Cao, supra note 24, at 188; The Law of the People's Republic of China on
Chinese Foreign Joint Ventures (July 1, 1979) in 3 Commercial Business and Trade
Laws: People's Republic of China (Owen D. Nee Jr. ed., 1991); Browning, supra note 24,
at 13.
134. See Mayer, supra note 130, at 2; Const. of the People's Republic of China. Nota-
bly, the Constitution recognizes both the interdependence of the PRC with "the whole
world," and the need for modernization. Id. at prmbl. For example, Article 18 specifi-
cally authorizes foreign enterprises to invest in China and cooperate economically with
other Chinese enterprises. See id. art. 18. For further discussion of Chinese constitu-
tional law see generally Chin Kim, supra note 81, at 1415-18.
135. See Han Xu, supra note 112, at 160.
136. See Gan Chongdou, Open Policy Updates China's Legal System, 3 China L. Rep.
163, 163 (1986).
137. See Lee, supra note 18, at 7; Donahoe, supra note 104, at 185.
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China's pursuit of modem economic standards suggests that, "in the
1990's the business of the [Chinese Communist] party is business."'3 8 In
fact, as Marxism loses its ideological influence over the Chinese people,
economic growth may be the CCP's most powerful means of maintaining
its power./19 Consistent with these ideas, China's leadership has ex-
pressly and publicly committed itself to economic reform. 140 Among the
areas targeted for revision are those the government deems important for
modernization, such as the stock market, 1 ' banking, 42 and insur-
138. Kristof, supra note 5, at A5.
139. See Birth of A New Economy, supra note 7.
140. See id; China Casting Its Lot With Market Economy, Newsday, Oct. 13, 1992, at
15 [hereinafter Casting Its Lot].
141. See China Steps Up Legislature for Finance, Xinhua News, May 10, 1993, avail-
able in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File; Casting Its Lot, supra note 140, US, Hong Kong.
Show the Way to Money Men, Bus. Wdy., Sept. 19, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-
NEWS File. China's enthusiasm for stock markets and securities has developed rapidly
over the past three years. As of September 1993, 46 companies listed on the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange and 80 on the Shanghai. Along with this growth in the number of secur-
ities traded the number of securities companies has increased; there are currently 205 in
Shenzhen, including 10 foreign firms, and 448 in Shanghai.
While this growth reflects the growing capitalist spirit in China, it also highlights the
need for more effective regulation. Both stock exchanges and the China Securities Regu-
latory Commission ("CSRC") have discovered discrepancies between the prospectuses of
listed companies and their actual practices, as well as problems of timely reporting of
market sensitive data. Such problems stem from the division of supervisory responsibili-
ties between the People's Bank of China and the CSRC. A new national securities law,
modeled on the United States' Securities and Exchange Commission, is expected in 1994.
This law will vest greater power in the CSRC and may overcome existing problems in this
area. See Simon Holberton, Regulators Battle to Catch Up, Fin. Times, Nov. 18, 1993, at
§ III, XIi.
In addition to stock market and securities regulations, a futures trading law is sched-
uled for completion in the next year. See Gao Anming, China to Forge A Legal Economic
Framework, China Daily, Nov. 20, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File.
142. See China Alters Banking Role, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1983, at D15; China Fo-
cuses on Banking Reform, Reuter Newswire, Sept. 11, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
INT-NEWS File. Over the last 14 years, dramatic changes have occurred in China's
banking industry. "Originally little more than a means of directing credits to state enter-
prises," China's banking system has increased its role as a source of funds for both enter-
prises and domestic savings. Edward Balls, Still A Long Way To Go, Fin. Times, Nov.
18, 1993, at § III, XI. Since 1984, the People's Bank has been the nation's central institu-
tion, id, formulating and implementing monetary and currency policies. See Gao Anm-
ing, supra note 141. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China handles commercial
activities, and three other state banks, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of
China, and the People's Construction Bank, deal in the areas of agriculture, construction,
and trade finance. See id.; Balls, supra. While these entities still dominate the industry,
numerous other financial institutions have entered the marketplace, and foreign banks
have received licenses permitting them to finance trade transactions. See Balls, supra.
This growing sophistication, however, has revealed major flaws in the Chinese system.
See id. For instance, the state banks curtail competition and interest rate policy. See id.
Lax regulation by the PBC has led to illegal lending to non-bank institutions which then
lend to third parties at higher interest rates. See id Furthermore, the decentralized
structure of the PBC hinders the implementation of national monetary policy. See id.
The PBC's power, however, has grown significantly during the past year, and further
reforms are scheduled. See id A new banking law is intended to transform the state
banks into more independent commercial banks so that they can serve as the backbone of
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ance. 4 3 Progress is already evident: 3M has a wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary,'" over sixty Chinese-American joint ventures exist,145 and
several large American corporations such as General Motors, General
Electric, International Business Machines, and Ford are exploring Chi-
nese joint-venture opportunites.146
Similar development is taking place within the Chinese insurance in-
dustry. American International Group ("AIG") recently opened an in-
dependent office and commenced insurance sales in Shanghai. 147 More
than thirty additional foreign insurers currently have representative of-
fices in China.14 While these entities must satisfy a three-year waiting
period before commencing operations, 4 9 their presence underscores both
the impact of China's modernization policies and the potential for
growth in China's insurance industry.
III. THE CHINESE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. History
Insurance in China has a long, yet erratic, history. Industry commen-
tators consider ancient China the birthplace of insurance.150 Thousands
of years ago, merchants on the Yangtze River actively traded food and
goods between central China and its coastal cities.' 5' This thousand kilo-
meter trek exposed their small boats to a variety of hazards, such as ban-
dits, rapids, and pilferage.' 52 To prevent the total loss of any one
shipment, the merchants created collective agreements to share the loss
of any vessel when it occurred.153 For instance, a merchant who shipped
five percent of the total amount of cargo on a vessel would absorb five
percent of any loss or damage to that shipment. 154
Despite these roots, the Chinese insurance industry is still in its in-
fancy."' Although activity continued from its early practices, it was
limited by a lack of mechanisms for enforcing contractual risk-sharing
the nation's banking system. See Gao Anming, supra note 141. "[T]here is," however,
"a long way to go before China has a viable and competitive banking system." Balls,
supra.
143. See Chen, supra note 26; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Li Peng Committed to Economic
Co-operation, South China Morning Post, Sept. 2, 1992, available in WESTLAW, INT-
NEWS File.
144. See Nai-Ruenn Chen & Jeffrey Lee, supra note 6, at 26.
145. See Han Xu, supra note 112, at 161.
146. See US, Hong Kong, Show the Way to Money Men, supra note 141.
147. See Robert Keatley, AIG Sells Insurance in Shanghai, Testing Service Firms' Role,
Wall St. J., July 21, 1993, at Al.
148. See Chen, supra note 26.
149. See id.





155. See McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 1.
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arrangements 5 6 and the absence of wide-spread domestic industrializa-
tion. 5 7 A modern insurance industry began to develop around 1805,
and over two hundred companies operated in China by 1949.158 But
from the end of the Opium War in 1842 until the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, foreign companies dominated the Chinese insurance
market. 159
Following the end of China's dynastic rule and the Nationalists' rise to
power in 1911, the Chinese conducted insurance activities primarily to
support foreign trade.16 The Bank of China established The China In-
surance Company to provide insurance for cargo and other activities, 161
but British insurers limited Chinese market share. 162 The industry
maintained this structure throughout the wars and civil strife that
plagued China until Communist victory in 1949.163
Shortly after the PRC's founding on October 1, 1949, the CCP author-
ized a number of state corporations, including the People's Insurance
Company of China. 164 When the PICC opened its first branch in Shang-
hai in November 1950, it was the only authorized insurer in China;165 by
1956, all other insurers which previously had operated in China had left
or disappeared as a result of communist rule. 166 The PICC's customers
included other state corporations, agricultural collectives, and individu-
als, for whom it wrote cargo-in-transit, domestic property, and life insur-
ance. 167 Despite the size of the Chinese population, the PICC generated
a relatively small amount of premium.16
In 1959, the philosophy of the Great Leap Forward 169 prompted the
government to change its attitude toward insurance.170 Communist doc-
trine, which mandated that government protect its organizations and in-
156. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 105.
157. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 3. China's primitive economy and its accompany-
ing poverty have been catalysts of the nation's protracted civil dislocations and reform.
One historian describes China's historic economic condition prior to 1949 as "not a tem-
porary or incidental poverty but a fundamental condition in the sense that land, labor,
and capital were not yet 'developed' to a degree capable of producing modern abundance
for the entire society." Id. at 4.
158. See Halliard, supra note 23, at 18.
159. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 106. Foreign Companies operated primarily in
cities like Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong. See id.
160. See id.
161. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 106.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 106. The CCP frowned on private industry and
intended the PICC to "clean up" the domestic market. See Batchelor, supra note 12, at
45.
165. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 106.
166. See Halliard, supra note 23, at 18.
167. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 106.
168. See id.




dividuals, made irrelevant other means of security, such as insurance, 7,
Although the PICC continued to operate in the cities of Shanghai and
Hangzhou,172 its business were limited to foreign trade activities, primar-
ily insuring cargo and hull risks. 173 The State subsequently assumed all
damages claims,' 74 and the domestic market virtually vanished.
Suspension of insurance continued during the next two decades. 75
From 1959 to 1976, China endured a series of domestic political upheav-
als which further eviscerated the already-limited market. 176 The Cul-
tural Revolution, for example, exacerbated existing disturbances and
created "hazards and perils that were not insurable even if the PICC had
not been eliminated from the market." 177 The government even halted
insurance activities in Shanghai and Hangzhou, which had retained in-
surance operations during previous political policy changes. 178
The government eventually was unable to uphold its responsibility to
assume insurance-type claims, 179 and re-authorized the industry in
1979.'"° In conjunction with the Four Modernizations and the Open
Door Policy, China resumed trade and investment activities with foreign-
ers.'' To further these policies and facilitate foreign investment in
China, the National People's Congress passed The Law of the People's
Republic of China on Chinese Foreign Joint Ventures. 182 Article 8 of the
Joint Venture Law deals with insurance, mandating that Chinese insur-
ance companies serve all Joint Venture insurance needs. 183 Because the
PICC was the only authorized insurer at the time this law passed, this
provision effectively granted it a domestic monopoly. 84
The monopoly ended in 1985111 with passage of the Provisional Regu-
lations Governing the Administration of Insurance Enterprises ("Regu-
lations"). 18 6 The Regulations opened the domestic market to other
Chinese insurers 187 but retained certain lines of insurance for the PICC,
171. Robert B. Shanks, Protecting Investments in China (Oct. 27, 1986) in Legal As-
pects of Doing Business with China 1986, at 409 (Eugene A. Thoroux, Chairman, Prac-
ticing Law Institute).
172. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 106.
173. See id.
174. See Liu Hongru, supra note 6, at 337-38.
175. See id.; Batchelor, supra note 12, at 45.
176. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 106.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See Liu Hongru, supra note 6, at 338.
180. See Halliard, supra note 23, at 18.
181. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 106.
182. See id.
183. See The Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese Foreign Joint Ven-
tures, supra note 133, art. 8.
184. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 106.
185. See id. at 107.
186. See infra part II.C.
187. See id.; Regulations, supra note 25.
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such as foreign business projects.""' Domestic competitors subsequently
entered the marketplace. In 1988, China Merchant Steam Navigation
formed the Ping An Insurance Company,18 9 followed in 1990 by the
China Pacific Insurance Company and the Xinjiang Agricultural Insur-
ance Company.190 Up to this point, the government maintained its ban
on foreign insurers. 19
1
B. Current Status of the Marketplace
Despite the dampening effects on the Chinese economy caused by the
worldwide reaction to the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Chi-
nese insurance industry is burgeoning.1 92 Property insurance covers an
estimated 700,000 firms and 143,000,000 families, t93 and approximately
313,000,000 individuals have purchased personal insurance policies.' 94
Furthermore, the PICC has performed positively. At year-end 1992, the
company reported 2800 branches, 80,000 employees, and 13,000 full-
time agents.195 Total revenue for the year was RMB 36.8 billion, a fifty-
six percent increase over 1991,196 and the total value of property insured
was RMB 4560.7 billion.' 9
7
In other domestic developments, the PICC recently created a subsidi-
ary, China Insurance Hong Kong, to oversee the operations of eight
China-funded insurance and reinsurance companies, as well as other fi-
nancial enterprises in Hong Kong and Macao.' 98 More importantly, the
government is currently drafting new insurance legislation to strengthen
the domestic market, encourage competition, and permit foreign compa-
les to operate.' 99
Foreign investment is also rapid as American and European compa-
nies attempt to establish niches within the Chinese market. AIG is the
first foreign company licensed to operate an independent office in
188. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 107.
189. See Halliard, supra note 23, at 18.
190. See id.; Batchelor, supra note 12, at 45; Mulrenan, supra note 11, at 14; L.H. Otis.
China In Licenses Unlikely for up to Five Years, Nat'l Underwriter, July 12, 1993, at 3.
191. See Batchelor, supra note 12, at 45; Mulrenan, supra note 11, at 14.
192. See Batchelor, supra note 12, at 45.
193. Liu Weiling, Law to Put Strict Controls on Commercial Insurance Biz, Bus. Wkly.,
Jan. 2, 1993.
194. Id; see Halliard, supra note 23, at 18.
195. See id
196. Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China Speaks Out, Ins. Res. Letter, Sept.
1993, at 2.
197. 1& Shortly after the Revolution, the CCP created a unified national currency
called "People's currency" or renminbi ("RMB"). See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 6. The
basic unit or currency is the yuan; subsidiary units are jiao (ten jiao = one yuan) and fen
(ten fen = one jiao). See id at 7 & n.*. For example, RMB 1000.55 signifies renminbi
one thousand yuan, five jiao, five fen. See id at 7.
198. See Chen, supra note 26.
199. See Halliard, supra note 23, at 18; Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China
Speaks Out, Ins. Res. Letter, Sept. 1, 1993, available in WESTLAWV, INT-NEWS File.
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China,2° and Sedgwick Group is the first licensed foreign insurance bro-
ker.2° ' Colonial Mutual Group, an American-based global financial
services firm, recently gained approval to establish a representative office
of its Asian affiliate, Jardine-CMG Life, in Bejing.2 °2 Joint ventures be-
tween the PICC and foreign companies are limited, but entities such as
The Guangdong Asia Insurance Company and The China American In-
ternational Insurance Company serve Chinese subsidiaries of foreign
multinationals. 203 In addition, although analysts expect no new foreign
insurance licenses for up to five years,2°4 about thirty foreign insurers
maintain representative offices in China20 5 in order to satisfy the three-
year waiting period required to apply for a license.20 6
C. Analysis of the Current Law
The Provisional Regulations Governing the Administration of Insur-
ance Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council in 1985,207 produced
two effects: they broke the PICC's monopoly in the domestic insurance
market20 and created a framework for the industry's governance and
development. The Regulations are simply constructed, consisting of six
chapters which encompass twenty-four articles. Despite the skeletal con-
tent of these articles, they provide a workable scheme for controlling the
growth and operation of a domestic insurance industry.
Chapter I of the Regulations outlines the "General Provisions" of Chi-
nese Insurance Law. Article 1 proclaims four broad purposes-to
strengthen state management of insurance enterprises, to promote devel-
opment of the insurance industry, to protect insured persons, and to fa-
cilitate use of economic compensation to benefit "socialist modernization
200. See Halliard, supra note 23, at 18; Keatley supra note 131, at Al. AIG's branch,
located in Shanghai, is more of a re-establishment than a ground-breaking event. Ameri-
can entrepreneur Cornelius Vander Starr originally founded the company in Shanghai in
1919, and operated in China until forced out by the Communists in 1950. See id. at Al,
A9; News Release from American International Group, Inc., John T. Wooster, Vice
President, Communications, American International Group Gains License to Operate First
Foreign-Owned Insurance Business in China (Oct. 5, 1992) (on file with Fordham Law
Review).
201. See Lisa S. Howard, Sedgwick is First Broker to be Licensed in China, Nat'l Un-
derwriter, July 12, 1993, at 3; Liu Weiling, supra note 193. Insurance transactions be-
tween insurers and consumers take a variety of forms. In addition to direct marketing,
insurers may empower separate companies to represent them in their dealings with the
public. Terms such as "agent," "broker," or "producer" describe these companies, and
their employees. See Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to
Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices 80 (1988).
202. See Colonial Mutual Gets approval for Beijing Office, Reuter Newswire, Jan. 29,
1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File; Firm to Open in Bejing, South China
Morning Post, Jan. 30, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File.
203. See Batchelor, supra note 12, at 46.
204. See Otis, supra note 190, at 3.
205. See Chen, supra note 26.
206. See id.
207. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 107; Regulations, supra note 25.
208. See China Opens the Door to Insurance Firms, Chi. Trib., April 4, 1985, at 4.
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... and the stability of the people's livelihood."2 '9 Article 2 applies the
Regulations to all "insurance enterprises transacting any type of insur-
ance business,"'2 1 and Article 3 restricts the market to domestic
companies.211
Article 4 establishes the People's Bank of China ("PBC") as the state
agency charged with insurance management.21 2 It also specifies several
industry functions over which the PBC exercises control, such as creat-
ing industry policy and guidelines, approving the establishment of insur-
ance enterprises, and supervising the market, policy terms and rates, and
company audits.213 Article 4 further empowers the PBC to impose eco-
nomic sanctions upon, or force the closing of, insurers who either violate
State laws or endanger "the legitimate interests of the [i]nsured. ' 1 4
Article 5, the final clause of Chapter I, encourages insurers to develop
"rural business. '215 Given the language used, this clause is more a re-
quirement than an option.2 16 Furthermore, it mandates that insurers
separate their rural activities from all other insurance business.217
Chapter II sets forth requirements for the "Establishment of Insurance
Enterprises." Article 6 details the process through which an insurer may
become licensed in China. Entities must apply to the "state agency in
charge of insurance"21 for licensing by submitting their Articles of Asso-
ciation,219 evidence of sufficient capital, 2 0 and a list of their management
personnel.221 Insurers who attempt to operate without a license may be
"examined and penalized" by the PBC. 2 22 Article 7 mandates PBC ap-
proval for any changes to the information required by Article 6.3
Article 8 sets forth financial standards for insurers based on whether
they write life insurance, policies other than life insurance, or both types
of coverages."2 A further financial requirement, set forth in Article 9,
states that insurers must deposit a twenty percent cash guarantee in a
State specified bank as security, withdrawal of which is controlled by the
209. Regulations, supra note 25, art. 1.
210. Id. art. 2.
211. See id. art. 3.
212. See id. art. 4.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See id. art. 5.
216. Article 5 provides, in part, that "[t]he State encourages insurance enterprises to
develop rural business and to provide insurance services to peasants. Insurance enter-
prises shall support peasants to set up rural mutual insurance cooperatives by pooling
funds on a voluntary basis." Id.
217. See id
218. Id. art. 6. Article 4 sets forth the People's Bank of China as the state agency in
charge of insurance. See id. art. 4; supra text accompanying notes 212-14.
219. See id. art. 6(1).
220. See id. art. 6(2).
221. See id. art. 6(3).
222. Id art. 6.
223. See id. art. 7.
224. See id. art. 8.
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PBC.2 25 Article 10 supplements Article 8 by imposing a separation re-
quirement upon the accounting records of insurance entities which write
both life and non-life insurance policies.226
The Regulations also contain a brief section, Chapter III, regarding
the PICC. Article 11 first broadly defines the scope of PICC business.227
The PICC may engage in all classes of reinsurance, 228 advisory services
to other insurance enterprises, 229 international activities related to insur-
ance on the State's behalf,230 and "other business authorized by the
State. ' 23 1 Article 12 provides the PICC with exclusive power to write
insurance policies required by law, 232 insurance in foreign currency,
233
and international reinsurance business.234 The Regulations also reserve
for the PICC insurance related to specific types of business entities.235
The legislation governing the PICC contains similar restrictions. 236
Chapter IV of the Regulations describes "Capacity to Pay Claims and
Insurance Reserves." Articles 13 and 14 set forth the minimum capacity
allowed for insurers dealing in both non-long term life237 and long-term
life insurance. 238 Article 15 details the level of reserves an insurer must
maintain in order "[t]o protect the interests of the [i]nsured. ' ' 239 Reserve
amounts for unrealized liabilities 24 and life insurance241 are each speci-
fied, as are general reserve requirements for both state and private enter-
prises.242 In a provision analogous to Article 10, Article 16 imposes a
separation requirement on reserve funds for personal, and other types of
insurance.243 The final article of Chapter IV simply empowers the state
agency in charge of insurance, the PBC,2 4 to regulate all reserve funds,
and imposes an obligation of conformity upon insurers.245
Chapter V of the Regulations covers reinsurance.246 All insurers in
China must reinsure a minimum of thirty percent of their total business
225. See id. art. 9.
226. See id. art. 10.
227. See id. art. 11.
228. See id. art. 11(1).
229. See id. art. 11(2).
230. See id. art. 11(3).
231. Id. art. 11(4).
232. See id. art. 12(1)
233. See id. art. 12(2).
234. See id. art. 12(4).
235. See id. art. 12(3).
236. See Articles of Association of the People's Insurance Company of China (Dec. 27,
1982), available in WESTLAW, CHINALAW File [hereinafter Articles of the PICC].
237. See Regulations, supra note 25, art. 13.
238. See id. art. 14.
239. Id. art. 15.
240. See id. art. 15(1).
241. See id. art. 15(2).
242. See id. art. 15(3).
243. See id. art. 16; supra text accompanying note 226.
244. See id. art. 4; supra text accompanying notes 212-14.
245. See id. art. 17.
246. Reinsurance is a secondary insurance market in which insurance companies
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with the PICC.247 Furthermore, reinsurance through foreign insurers is
prohibited, save for special exceptions as determined by the state.24 In
addition, insurers writing non-life insurance are forbidden from writing
policies on any "risk unit" exceeding ten percent of its total capacity
reserves without special permission from the PBC; 49 if permission is
granted, the amount exceeding ten percent must be reinsured through the
PICC.250 Finally, Chapter VI contains supplementary provisions and
definitions.2 51
China appears to have rediscovered both the social and financial bene-
fits of insurance as an element of economic modernization. From the
days of the Yangtze River merchants252 to the 1985 Regulations, the in-
dustry has come full circle. Although the Regulations are far from com-
prehensive, or even sufficient to control a potentially expansive market,
they represent a starting point from which further reforms can be
launched.
IV. INSURANCE LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM
While sparse by American standards, the 1985 Regulations are func-
tional for an insurance market with few competitors. The historic mo-
nopolization by the PICC necessitated little comprehensive regulation.
Moreover, the PICC is a state-owned entity run by the PBC;2 3 as such,
the government tacitly controls the industry regardless of legislation.
The destruction of the PICC's monopoly, however, opens the door to
increased competition and decreased state control over the industry. Al-
ready, other domestic insurers are licensed to write insurance2  and for-
eign insurers are positioning themselves in anticipation of further market
liberalization.255 Because the conditions for which the 1985 Regulations
were drafted have changed, it is necessary to review their adequacy for
the current market.
Examining the 1985 Regulations in light of recent developments
transfer a share of their risk to another insurer or group of insurers. See Keeton &
Widiss, supra note 201, at 13.
247. See Regulations, supra note 25, Art. 18.
248. See id art. 20.
249. See iL art. 19.
250. See id
251. Article 21 proscribes definitions for "Life Insurance," id. art. 21(1), "other than
life insurance," iL art 21(2), "Reinsurance," id. at art. 21(3), and "Risk Unit," id. art.
21(4). Article 22 applies Articles 18 and 20 to "shipowners protection an indemnity
mutual associations." Id art. 22. Article 23 removes social insurance from the scope of
the Regulations, see id art. 23, and Article 24 sets out the effective date of the Regula-
tions as April 1, 1985. See id. art. 24.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
253. See Regulations, supra note 25, art. 4.
254. See Otis, supra note 190, at 3; Special Report-China-Markets Cheered by Monop-
oly Break Up, Lloyd's List, April 7, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File
[hereinafter Markets Cheered].




reveals two major points. First, their content is sufficient for licensing
and solvency purposes. The Regulations set forth basic provisions for
authorizing and monitoring insurers. For instance, Article 2 applies the
regulations to all insurance enterprises within China. 56 Article 4 autho-
rizes the PBC to monitor and govern the industry."' 7 Chapter II con-
tains licensing requirements to which all insurers are subject, and which
the PBC must enforce.258 Furthermore, the Regulations address the fi-
nancial issues both unique and crucial to the industry: Article 8 estab-
lishes the minimum capital required for an entity to legally transact
insurance business,"' Article 9 requires a security deposit," and Chap-
ter IV details capacity and reserve requirements.26'
These provisions establish a framework within which the Chinese gov-
ernment can control the licensing and financial health of insurance com-
panies within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, because a state-controlled
organ, the PBC, governs the industry, the Chinese government is in a
position not only to perceive, but also to address any legislative inadequa-
cies concerning market regulation. Given the emphasis which the gov-
ernment has placed on insurance development, any deficiencies in this
area likely will merit prompt attention.
The Regulations' adequacy for licensing and solvency purposes con-
trasts with the second point which the current marketplace reveals: the
Regulations are deficient with respect to consumer protection. The Reg-
ulations mention "safeguarding the interest of the party covered by in-
surance" as one of their main purposes.262 Aside from this statement of
intention, however, the Regulations contain no means of implementa-
tion. Although Article 4 grants the PBC broad supervisory power over
the industry,2 63 and Article 15 imposes requirements "[t]o protect the
interests of the [i]nsured,"'2 4 these two declarations comprise the entirety
of insurance consumer protection law. There is no legislation pertaining
to consumer-specific concerns such as unfair marketing practices. Unfair
trade practice prohibitions are similarly absent from the Articles of In-
corporation of the PICC.26 5
While the government's presence within the regulatory scheme is ade-
quate to police licensing and solvency, it is insufficient to protect con-
sumer interests. Culturally, commercial insurance is a novel, not a
typical, concern of the average Chinese citizen; the Chinese traditionally
have relied more on personal relations than on institutional or legal obli-
256. See Regulations, supra note 25, art. 2.
257. See id. art. 4.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 218-26.
259. See Regulations, supra note 25, art.8.
260. See id. art. 9.
261. See id. arts. 13-17.
262. Id. art. 1.
263. See id. art. 4.
264. Id. art. 15.
265. See Articles of the PICC, supra note 236.
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gations.26 6 As one commentator notes, "[t]he idea of service as a product
you sell doesn't quite register., 267
Furthermore, the Chinese historically possess a cultural distaste for
judicial dispute resolution. Social groups such as the village, clan, or
family, historically have played significant dispute settlement roles.2 68
Resort to courts is discouraged:
If you are not the aggrieved, you lose face because you somehow vio-
lated the laws of society. But if you are the aggrieved, going to court is
an admission that the other party does not have sufficient respect for
you to settle promptly outside of court. It is therefore an admission of
lost face.269
Consequently, a citizen harmed by an insurer's trade practices is unlikely
to sue for redress.270 Such reluctance hinders not only individual restitu-
tion, but also the creation of adverse judgments as deterrents to future
unfair acts.
In addition to these cultural factors, financial and marketing issues
further highlight the inadequacy of the 1985 Regulations with respect to
consumer protection. Despite the nation's recent economic boom and
increase in per capita wealth,27 the majority of Chinese citizens are still
peasant farmers.2 72 The precarious financial status of agricultural work-
ers leaves them little room for uneducated or unwise purchases.
Furthermore, the nature of insurance is such that customers are un-
able to discern if they have been misled or misinformed until a loss actu-
ally occurs.2 73 Insurance is a contract to pay for a loss upon the
happening of a specified event;274 "[u]nlike other products and services,
the consumer cannot see or evaluate [insurance] until after the
purchase." '75 Thus, an insurance consumer must rely on a policy's
words, or an agent's explanation of those words, for knowledge of its
terms and conditions.2 76 Such inequality of information and bargaining
power disadvantages the Chinese in their dealings with insurance and
other financial institutions.277 The sales methods used by a life insurance
266. See Phillip M. Chen, Law and Justice: The Legal System of China 2400 B.C. to
1960 A.D., at 25-26 (1973).
267. Keatley, supra note 147, at A9.
268. See Chen, supra note 266, at 7.
269. Id.
270. See Lee, supra note 18, at 1-2.
271. See Chen, supra note 26.
272. See Kristof, supra note 5, at A5.
273. See Comptroller General, Report to the Congress of the Unites States, Issues and
Needed Improvements in State Regulation of the Insurance Business 11 (Oct. 9,
1979)[hereinafter Comptroller General].
274. See Lorimer, supra note 17, at 27.
275. Comptroller General, supra note 273, at 11.
276. See Lorimer, supra note 17, at 27.
277. Cf Comptroller General, supra note 273 (discussing the inequality of information




agent of the first foreign company licensed in China highlight these
concerns:
Briefcase in hand and smile on straight, he dodges through busy
traffic to accost an electronics-shop owner idling in his own doorway.
A few quick words, and he has lured the man inside. Some fast talk,
and the slightly puzzled shop owner has become the newest customer
of American International Group Inc., the only foreign insurance com-
pany in China selling directly to Chinese citizens.
'I never believed in such things before, 'confesses Zhang Shengdong,
the shopkeeper, as he pays his first year's life insurance premium in
cash. 'I just decided to have a try-a new taste-to see what it's
like.'27 8
Despite its presence in China's regulatory scheme, the PBC cannot
adequately prevent such marketing practices. Unlike issues of licensing
or solvency, the State cannot police individual insurance transactions to
protect consumers. Instead, written regulations specifying prohibited
conduct are necessary to deter companies from unfair trade practices, to
inform consumers that such conduct is unacceptable, and to impose
sanctions against violators.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
While the value of consumer protection law applicable to China's in-
surance industry is obvious, sources for such provisions are not. Analo-
gous domestic laws, as well as those of culturally similar nations, are
scarce. Because the goals and purposes of insurance regulation in the
Unites States are similar to those of China, The Model Unfair Trade
Practices Act of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
may provide a model for legislative reform consistent with China's legal
and social scheme.
A. Source of Suggested Reforms
In China, "the total number of volumes of statutory material, judicial
decisions, legal treatises and the like published since 1949 would not fill a
small bookcase. ' z 79 The law which does exist is scarce and often cursory
in nature. 280 Thus, there is little domestic legislation from which to draw
278. See Keatley, supra note 147, at Al.
279. Li, supra note 129, at 14.
280. See Chin Kim, supra note 81, at 1413-14. Two Chinese laws provide exception to
this rule. The Provisional Advertising Law forbids "trickery and forgery," Provisional
Regulations Governing Advertisement (May 1, 1982), at art. 6, in 3 Commercial Business
and Trade Laws: People's Republic of China (Owen D. Nee, Jr. ed., 1991), and mandates
that advertising "by all enterprises," id. art. 2, be "distinct, clear, practical and realistic."
Id. art. 6. Similarly, the Marine Commerce Law is instructive; Article 22 imposes a duty
upon an insurer to make "truthful disclosures to the policy-holder in respect of key is-
sues." Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China Speaks Out, Ins. Res. Letter, Sept.
1, 1993, at 2. While such prescriptions are necessary for consumer protection, and could
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analogies or examples to create consumer protection for the Chinese in-
surance industry.
In the absence of domestic provisions, the laws of culturally similar
nations are a typical source of legislative inspiration. 8' Within Asia,
however, unfair trade prohibitions are scarce. For instance, the Insur-
ance Law of the Republic of China, both before and after the Communist
victory, contains no such provisions.28 2 Japanese insurance law contains
one article cursorily prohibiting misrepresentations in the "conclusion or
solicitating of insurance contracts. ' 28 3 Again, effective reform requires a
more comprehensive model.
American insurance codes are replete with insurance trade regulations.
With few exceptions,2 4 all states and territories have legislation pat-
terned after, or similar to, the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act,
("Model Act") promulgated by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. 2 5 Because there is little useful Chinese or Asian law in
this area, American ideas, specifically the NAIC Model Act, can provide
guidance for Chinese legal reform.
Structurally, insurance regulation in China differs substantially from
that in the United States. The national government dominates Chinese
insurance28 6 while individual state governments control the American in-
surance industry.28 7 In China, the 1985 Regulations retain the power to
regulate insurance within the central government; Article 4 designates
the PBC, a state institution, as the agency in charge of insurance.288 By
contrast, insurance regulation in the United States is primarily the prov-
ince of state, rather than federal, administrators.2 9 The McCarran-Fer-
be adopted as part of revised insurance law provisions, they alone are insufficient to regu-
late unfair trade practices
281. See Armacost, supra note 7, at 158.
282. Insurance Law: The Republic of China (Dec. 30, 1929, as amended Jan 11, 1937,
as amended Sept. 2, 1963).
283. Law Concerning the Control of Insurance Soliciting, Law #171, July 15, 1948,
Art. 16, at 121, 130 in Japanese Insurance Laws, Ordinances and Regulations (Teiji
Koike trans., 1990).
284. Forty-three jurisdictions have enacted or administratively adopted versions of the
NAIC's model unfair trade legislation. See Stephen S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions: Lia-
bility and Damages § 9:02 & n.16 (1993).
285. See id. The NAIC, formed in 1871, is the oldest voluntary association of state
officials. It includes the principle insurance regulatory authorities of all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and Unites States's territories. See Statement of Commissioner
John A. Durkin Insurance Commissioner of the State of New Hampshire on behalf of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners on S. 984, S. 1222 and S. 1378, Apr. 29,
1971, at 1 [hereinafter Statement of John A. Durkin].
286. See Regulations, supra note 25.
287. See Comptroller General, supra note 273, at 1.
288. See Regulations, supra note 25, art 4.
289. Prior to 1944, insurance was not considered 'commerce,' and was thus immune
from federal regulation. See Proceedings of the NAIC, NAIC Model Regulations Service
880-19 (Jan. 1993); 2 James J. Lorimer et. aL, The Legal Environment of Insurance 286
(1982). On June 4, 1944, however, the Supreme Court altered this premise in United
States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), holding that, if con-
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guson Act 290 dictates that insurance is "subject to the laws of the several
states." '291 Federal law applies only to the extent that business is not
regulated by state law.2 92
Despite these dissimilarities, the goals and purposes of insurance regu-
lation in both countries are comparable and justify China's adoption of
Western principles in its domestic law. Article 1 of China's Regulations
sets forth "safeguarding the interest of the party covered by insurance"
as one of the law's general purposes.2 93 Chapter II regulates solvency,
capacity and reserve amounts to protect the financial interests of in-
sureds.29 4 Insurance regulation in the United States serves like objec-
tives.2 95 For example, financial concerns regarding insurer solvency and
prudent investment management are standard aims of state insurance
codes. 296 Legislation aimed at "avoiding overreaching by insurers" and
related goals, such as promoting fair consumer treatment and enhancing
public information regarding insurance, is also common.297 Further-
more, one of the NAIC's stated purposes is to promote legislative uni-
formity and disseminate information in order to "establish means to fully
ducted across state lines, insurance was interstate commerce subject to federal regulation.
See Proceedings of the NAIC, supra, at 880-19; Lorimer, supra, at 286. Consequently, a
number of federal statutes became applicable to insurance which directly conflicted with
state laws. See Proceedings of the NAIC, supra, at 880-19.
For instance, the Sherman Act, prohibiting restraints of trade, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988),
and monopolies, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), rejected the commonly accepted insurance practice
of formulating property and liability rates in concert. See Lorimer, supra, at 287. Section
2 of the Clayton Act, prohibiting certain discriminations of price among purchasers of
similar commodities, see id. at 285, endangered the pricing mechanisms traditionally used
by insurance companies to accommodate policies covering varying levels of risk. Fur-
thermore, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act's prohibition of "[u]nfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce" created dual state and federal jurisdiction over
the governance of trade practices. See Proceedings of the NAIC, supra, at 880-19.
Recognizing the problems which such conflicting laws and jurisdiction could pose,
Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1988), stating that
after June 30, 1948, the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts would be inapplicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that business was regulated by state law. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (1988); Lorimer, supra, at 286.
290. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1988).
291. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 201, at 931-32; see Lorimer, supra note 289, at 286-
289.
Responding to the McCarran Act, the NAIC developed a model unfair trade practices
act. See Ashley, supra note 285, § 9:02. Although many state had regulations governing
this field prior to 1945, the McCarran Act catalyzed a nationwide effort to create uniform
legislation in order to preempt FTC jurisdiction. See id. The Supreme Court affirned
that such state legislation precluded application of the FTC Act in FTC v. National
Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958). See id. at 6 n.8.
292. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 201, at 931-32; see Lorimer, supra note 289, at 286-
87.
293. See Regulations, supra note 25, art 4.
294. See id. arts. 6-10.
295. See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 201, at 938-39.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 938 & n.6; Comptroller General, supra note 273, at 237.
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protect the interests of insurance policy holders."2 9 Such similar intent
supports the incorporation of American concepts into Chinese domestic
law.
In addition to these aspirational likenesses, China's current approach
to legal reform actually espouses the incorporation of Western ideals.
Most Asian nations are eager to learn from the successes and failures of
the West and follow a "research and copy" or "research and adapt" ap-
proach, especially for financial reforms.2 99 China itself has specifically
endorsed "transplanting" economic laws from capitlist economies as a
"shortcut" to drafting legislation conducive to a market economy from
scratch.
300
In practice, China's efforts have been consistent with this philospohy.
Economic reformers have scanned the globe in search of economic mod-
els applicable to China.3 ' The committee currently revising the Regula-
tions has studied the insurance laws of sixteen developed and developing
nations and regions. 3 2 These practices and policies support the use of
the NAIC Model Act to reform China's insurance Regulations.
B. Scope of Reform
The Model Act offers a comprehensive approach to "defining, or pro-
viding for the determination of, all such practices in [a] state that consti-
tute unfair or deceptive acts or practices and ... prohibiting the trade
practices so defined. '30 3 It sets forth substantive and procedural sugges-
tions for use by state legislatures in creating their own consumer protec-
tion regulations. 3' The inspirational quality of the Model Act is
consistent with congressional intent that the public interest is best served
by state regulation of insurance.30 5
While its fifteen sections contain provisions inapplicable to the Chinese
industry,30 6 the Model Act proffers several possibilities for Chinese legis-
lative reform. Relevant provisions detail the nature of unfair trade prac-
298. Comptroller General, supra note 273, at 237.
299. See McGhie, supra note 16, at 63.
300. Chris Yeung, Capitalist Laws May Be Copied, South China Morning Post, Jan. 7,
1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File.
301. See Birth of A New Economy, supra note 7.
302. See Liu Weiling, supra note 193.
303. Model Act, supra note 31, § 1.
304. See Proceedings of the NAIC, supra note 289, at 880-19, § 1, at 880-20.
305. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988) ("Congress hereby declares that the continued regu-
lation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest."); Proceedings of the NAIC, supra note 289, at 880-19. Following the passage of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, one of the first areas to which state legislators turned their
attention was the development of trade practices legislation adequate to preempt the FTC
Act. See id at 880-19. It is from this initial effort, and the ongoing effort to strengthen
state control of this field that the NAIC Model Act developed. See id. § 1, at 880-20.
306. The Model Act contains sections dealing with judicial review of acts deemed un-
fair trade practices. See Model Act, supra note 31, § 9 (providing a right of judicial
review of orders regarding unfair trade practices for those subject to such orders); id. § 10
(providing a right of judicial review of hearings for any intervenor). Such provisions
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tices, methods of enforcement, and flexibility to address new or changed
circumstances. If adopted within a revised insurance regulation, these
sections of the Model Act would create a coherent body of consumer
protection law sufficient to shield Chinese consumers from improper in-
surer conduct.
1. Unfair Trade Practices
As discussed, the purpose of the Model Act is to define and prohibit
unfair trade practices, acts, and methods of competition.30 7 Sections 3
and 4 of the Model Act detail the nature and scope of unfair trade prac-
tices. Section 3 prohibits practices, as defined by Section 4, if they are
committed flagrantly 308 or "with such frequency to indicate a general
business practice., 30 9 Section 4 then defines twelve practices forbidden
as elements of unfair trade.310 The most relevant of these deal with mis-
representation,31' false information,31 2 and unfair discrimination.31 3
a. Misrepresentation
As defined in Section 4.A, misrepresentation encompasses eight differ-
ent acts or omissions which inaccurately express benefits, conditions or
terms of a policy, its dividends, surplus, or premium, or the nature of the
insurer itself.31 4 Because public policy supports rules discouraging negli-
would be impractical for an insurance industry in a nation like China with comparatively
few lawyers and a relatively undeveloped legal system. See Li, supra note 129, at 10.
307. See Model Act, supra note 31, § 1; supra notes 298 and 304-06 and accompanying
text.
308. See Model Act, supra note 31, § 3.A..
309. Id. § 3.B.
310. See id. § 4.A-O. These sections are titled as follows:
A. Misrepresentations and False Advertising of Insurance Policies.
B. False Information and Advertising Generally.
C. Defamation.
D. Boycott, Coercion and Intimidation.
E. False Statements and Entries.
F. Stock Operations and Advisory Board Contracts.
G. Unfair Discrimination.
H. Rebates.
I. Prohibited Group Enrollments.
J. Failure to maintain marketing and performance records.
K. Failure to Maintain Complaint Handling Procedures.
L. Misrepresentation in Insurance Applications.
M. Unfair Financial Planning Practices.
N. Failure to File or to Certify Information Regarding the Endoresement or
Sale of Long-Term Care Insurance.
0. Failure to Provide Claims History.
P. Violating any one of [a state's insurance laws deemed desired or necessary
as an unfair trade practice, such as cancellation and nonrenewal laws].
Id.
311. See id. §4.A.
312. See id. § 4.B.
313. See id. § 4.G.
314. See id. § 4.A. This section prohibits any communication which
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gence or misconduct in the insurance industry, 15 many American state
insurance codes incorporate misrepresentation prohibitions. These laws
typically forbid any employee or agent of a licensed insurer to make, or
cause to be made, any communication misrepresenting the terms, bene-
fits, or dividends of an insurance policy, or the financial condition of the
insurer.316 They further forbid the use of "any name or title of any pol-
icy or class of policies misrepresenting the true nature thereof.1317
These prohibitions provide similar benefits for both American and
(1) Misrepresents the benefits, advantages, conditions or terms of any policy;
or
(2) Misrepresents the dividends or shares of the surplus to be received on any
policy; or
(3) Makes a false or misleading statement as to the dividends or share of
surplus previously paid on any policy; or
(4) Is misleading or is a misrepresentation as to the financial condition of
any insurer, or as to the legal reserve system upon which any life insurer oper-
ates; or
(5) Uses any name or title of any policy or class of policies misrepresenting
the true nature thereof; or
(6) Is a misrepresentation, including any intentional misquote of premium
rate, for the purpose of inducing or tending to induce the purchase, lapse, forfei-
ture, exchange, conversion or surrender of any policy; or
(7) Is a misrepresentation for the purpose of effecting a pledge or assignment
of or effecting a loan against any policy; or
(8) Misrepresents any policy as being shares of stock.
IdL
315. See John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 10557,
at 632 (1982). In modern society insurance is "more a matter of necessity than a matter
of choice," Lorimer, supra note 17, at 33. The numerous causes of loss that threaten life,
family and property necessitate insurance coverage, as do laws governing activities like
driving an automobile. See id Because modem society, including the courts and legisla-
tures, recognize the public and individual interest in the existence of funds from which to
obtain recovery in the event of loss or injury, see id. at 34, the business of insurance is
quasi-public in character. See Appelman & Appelman, supra, § 10557, at 632 n.1; 44
C.J.S. Insurance § 31, at 102 (1993).
316. California's Unfair Practices Act governing the business of insurance prohibits
any trade practice constituting "unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive
act or practice in the business of insurance," Cal. Ins. Code § 790.02 (West 1993), per-
formed by "all... persons engaged in the business of insurance." Id. § 790.01. The law
includes "misrepresenting the terms of any policy to be issued or the benefits or advan-
tages promised thereby or the dividends or share of the surplus to be received... [and]
any misrepresentation as to the financial condition of any insurer" within its scope of
prohibited acts. Id § 790.03(a).
The Texas state Insurance Code has a similar purpose of "regulat[ing] trade practices
in the business of insurance" by defining and prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts, Tex.
Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.21 § 1(a) (West Supp. 1994), and applies to all those "engaged in
the business of insurance." Id art. 21.21 § 2. Texas defines misrepresentation in lan-
guage virtually identical to that of California. Id. art. 21.21 § 4.
Wisconsin forbids any employee or agent of a licensed insurer to "make or cause to be
made any communication relating to an insurance contract, the insurance business, any
insurer or any intermediary which contains false or misleading information, including
information misleading because of incompleteness." Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 628.34(1) (West
1980).
317. Cal. Ins. Code § 790.03(a) (West 1993); see Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.21
§ (4)(1) (West Supp. 1994); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 628.34(1) (West 1980).
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Chinese consumers. They encourage a fair description of policy benefits
and limitations and discourage misdirection in the sale of a policy. Such
protections are desirable for a product which the consumer cannot fully
examine or investigate without the aid of an insurance broker or other
representative with a vested interest in concluding a policy sale.
b. False Information and Advertising
Section 4.B of the Model Act governs the expression or advertising of
information regarding insurance or insurance business. 3 " Prohibiting
insurers from "publishing, disseminating, [or] circulating" via newspa-
per, magazine, radio, or television information which is "untrue, decep-
tive or misleading" covers similar ground as the rules prohibiting
misrepresentation, but expands the scope of coverage to include advertis-
ing practices specifically. 319 Again, American state codes widely endorse
this model and generally follow its spirit and scope.32 °
Regulating the content of insurance advertising encourages the dissem-
ination of accurate information about the purposes and limitations of in-
surance coverages. While this is a desirable aim in any industry or
nation, it is particularly beneficial for consumers in the Chinese insur-
ance market. The Chinese are relatively unfamiliar with insurance and
their industry is still unsophisticated. Consequently, unfair advertising
prohibitions are important for facilitating consumer education, as well as
for discouraging insurers from capitalizing on their monopoly of
information.
c. Unfair Discrimination
Discrimination is a central principle of insurance. Brokers and insur-
ers are in business to choose, from among a pool of applicants, risks least
likely to sustain a loss. 32 1 While selecting risks in such manner is accept-
able business practice, insurers may not "improperly exclude" a class of
prospective insureds.3 22 Such improper discrimination encompasses red-
318. See Model Act, supra note 31, § 4.B.
319. Id.
320. California, for example, defines untruthful, deceptive, or misleading statements as
"causing to be made or disseminated before the public ... in any newspaper or other
publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or proclamation, or in any
other manner or means whatsoever, any statement containing any assertion, representa-
tion or statement with respect to the business of insurance ... which is untrue, deceptive
or misleading." Cal Ins. Code § 790.03(b) (West 1993). The Texas Insurance Code sets
forth an analogous restriction. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.21 § 4(2) (West Supp.
1994). The Wisconsin Insurance Code does not contain a separate false information or
advertising provision. The scope of the state's misrepresentation provision, however, in-
cludes "any communication relating to an insurance contract," see Wisc. Stat. Ann.
§ 628.34(1) (West 1980), and seems to cover the same transactions as the specific laws of
California and Texas.
321. See Robert Riegel et al., Insurance Principles and Practices: Property and Liabil-
ity 20-21 (6th ed. 1976).
322. See Appleman & Appleman, supra note 315, § 10556 (Supp. 1993).
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lining, or discriminating against risks solely because of their geographic
location,323 refusing to insure property solely because of its age, 24 and
discriminating against individuals based on sex, race, religion, or national
origin.3
25
Section 4.G of the Model Act details eight different unfairly discrimi-
natory acts.326 In the area of life and health insurance, for example, the
Model Act forbids discrimination between "individuals of the same class
and equal expectation of life' 327 or "of essentially the same hazard."32
It further prohibits discrimination between any risks "of the same class
and of essentially the same hazard" based solely on their geographic lo-
cation,329 and against residential properties based solely on their age.330
With respect to benefit programs, the Model Act bans discrimination be-
cause of sex, marital status, race, religion, or national origin.33 I The
Model Act also contains provisions regarding an applicant's mental or
physical impairment, 332 and forbids insurers from refusing to insure a
risk solely because another has refused to write a policy, has cancelled a
policy, or has failed to renew an existing policy for such risk. 33
While state insurance codes vary in their specificity and degree of in-
clusion, they frequently contain similar provisions. Some ban insurers
from charging insureds different rates or premiums, or offering different
policy terms "except on the basis of classifications related to the nature
and the degree of the risk covered or the expenses involved. '3 1 Other
state laws prohibit discrimination solely in life, accident, and health in-
surance policies.3 35 Legislation discouraging, unfair discrimination is
sound consumer policy. It dissuades insurers from penalizing otherwise
acceptable risks solely because of immutable characteristics which alone
are not antithetical to sound underwriting judgment.
2. Enforcement
In addition to defining the scope of unfair trade practices, the Model
Act contains several provisions geared toward enforcing unfair trade
prohibitions. For example, Section 1 defines the Model Act's purpose
and specifies that "[n]othing herein shall be construed to create or imply
323. See Model Act, supra note 31, § 4.G.
324. See id. § 4.G(4)
325. See id. § 4.G(5).
326. See Model Act, supra note 31, § 4.G.
327. Id. § 4.G(1).
328. Id. § 4.G(2).
329. Id. § 4.G(3).
330. See id. § 4.G(4).
331. See id. § 4.G(5).
332. See id. § 4.G(6).
333. See id. § 4.G(7). Section 4.G(8) further specifies that violation of a state's recis-
sion laws is unfair discrimination. See id. § 4.G(8).
334. Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 628.34(3) (West 1980).
335. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.21 § 9 (West 1981).
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a private cause of action. 3 36 This language forbids private causes of ac-
tion against insurers for engaging in unfair consumer practices.3 37 Only
a state's insurance commissioner possesses the power to examine and in-
vestigate the affairs of insurers in that state and to determine whether
they have been or are engaged in practices prohibited by the Act.338
Vesting enforcement solely within the government is a feature crucial
to the Model Act's adaptability to the Chinese insurance environment.
The Chinese are predisposed to peaceful conciliation, not to formal ave-
nues of legal redress.339 Consequently, legislation dependent upon con-
sumer suits for enforcement would be both impractical and ineffective.
Empowering a government official or group with exclusive jurisdiction
over enforcement circumvents this problem. It promotes uniform appli-
cation of legal standards and is consistent with the Chinese government's
traditional degree of involvement in economic matters.
The Model Act also contains specific procedural and punitive provi-
sions for enforcement actions against insurers.340 It requires that the
commissioner provide insurers notice and an opportunity to be heard,
and allows for the presentation of witnesses and documents.3 4' In the
event an insurer is found to have violated consumer protection provi-
sions, the Model Act establishes monetary penalties for single and multi-
ple offenses. 342 The Model Act also empowers the commissioner to
suspend an insurer's license for violations an insurer "knew or reasonably
should have known" were unfair trade practices. 43
The supervisory structure created by the 1985 Regulations is analo-
gous to the Model Act. Although the Regulations grant authority over
Chinese insurance to the PBC instead of an insurance commissioner or
board, they provide the PBC a similar degree of power to investigate and
curtail unfair trade practices. 34 Thus, the structure and spirit of the
Model Act reflects Chinese cultural attitudes toward legal actions.
Moreover, the 1985 Regulations provide a solid foundation on which to
build an insurance regulatory structure based on the Model Act.
3. Flexibility
While consumer protection legislation is necessary for effective insur-
336. Model Act, supra note 31, § 1.
337. See Proceedings of the NAIC, supra note 289, at 880-21.
338. Model Act, supra note 34, § 6. This regulation provides: "The commissioner
shall have power to examine and investigate the affairs of every insurer in this state in
order to determine whether such insurer has been or is engaged in any unfair trade prac-
tice prohibited by this Act." Id.
339. See Chen, supra note 266, at 7.
340. See Model Act, supra note 31, § § 6-11.
341. See id. § 7.
342. See id. § 8.
343. Id.
344. The PBC has authority to inspect insurers, impose sanctions, and suspend
licenses. See Regulations, supra note 25, art. 4.
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ance regulation, it is not sufficient to protect consumers adequately. It is
impossible to proscribe all acts or omissions comprising unfair trade
practices within the insurance industry.345 Recognizing this, the Model
Act and many state insurance codes contain an omnibus, or catch-all,
clause.34 6
The catch-all provision applies when the state insurance regulator be-
lieves an insurer is engaging in a practice that, although not specifically
defined as such, is unfair or deceptive.347 Under this provision, the regu-
lator may call a hearing, determine if a questioned practice is contrary to
the public interest, and order the insurer to cease the offending activ-
ity.348 Many state codes possess a similar mechanism that empowers the
insurance commissioner to investigate and punish offenses that are not
enumerated in an unfair trade practices act, but which are nevertheless
deceptive, misleading, or unfairly discriminatory.349 Such provisions,
whether enacted in the United States or China, grant broad power to
state regulators to handle new violations as they emerge within the indus-
try. This flexibility is especially important in an underdeveloped market,
such as China's, that has not yet experienced problems typical of a com-
petitive marketplace.
345. See id art. 1.
346. See id. art. 7(a).
347. See ia; Lorimer, supra note 289, at 293.
348. See Model Act, supra note 31, § 7.A.
349. See Cal. Ins. Code § 790.06(a) (West 1993); see also Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art.
21.21 §§ 3, 5 (West 1981) (providing broad discretion to define unfair trade practices);
Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 628.34 (1 1),(12) (West Supp. 1993) (same). The form and language of
state omnibus provisions varies widely. California's statute, for instance, is modeled
closely on the Model Act. It provides, in pertinent part, that
[w]henever the commissioner shall have reason to believe that any person en-
gaged in the business of insurance is engaging in this State in any method of
competition or in any act or practice in the conduct of such business which is
not defined [by other sections of this act] and that such method is unfair or...
deceptive and that a proceeding by him . . . would be in the interest of the
public, he may issue and serve upon such person an order to show cause... and
a notice of hearing. Cal. Ins. Code § 790.06(a) (West 1993).
Texas state law is less straightforward. Article 21.21. § 3 forbids any trade
practice defined by the unfair trade act, "or determined pursuant to" the Act.
Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.21 § 3 (West 1981). Section 5 of this article then
empowers the state insurance board to "examine and investigate into the affairs
of every person engaged in the business of insurance to determine whether such
person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition or in any
unfair or deceptive act or practice prohibited by Section 3 .. " Id. art 21.21§ 5.
Wisconsin's "catch-all" provision is brief, yet intended to occupy the same
field of regulation as the Model Act. The relevant sections allow the state insur-
ance commissioner to "define specific unfair trade practices," Wisc. Stat. Ann.
§ 628.34(12) (West Supp. 1993), and prohibits any person from engaging in a
practice so defined. See id. § 628.34(11). The Committee Comment to the Wis-
consin Insurance Code explains that, despite its deviation from the Model Act,
the Wisconsin law covers the same ground as the Model Act. See Committee




Despite continued uncertainty regarding its political climate, "China is
fast on its way to joining Japan as an economic superpower. '350 While
China's growth necessarily entails foreign trade and international polit-
ical cooperation, consistent domestic policies are equally important.351
Without internal economic and legal stability, China cannot implement
the programs necessary for modernization and economic growth.
Toward this end, China has incorporated insurance within the scope of
its economic reforms.152 Nurturing and expanding insurance not only
will spread the risks inherent in industry, but also will enhance the capa-
bilities and sophistication of the nation's financial services. Revising do-
mestic insurance legislation is both a practical and a necessary step in
this process; reform will facilitate entry of foreign companies and raise
the industry to international standards.
In the rush toward legal modernization, legislators must not ignore
consumer interests. Most discussions regarding insurance reform focus
on structural issues such as market entry, licensing, and solvency. Con-
sumer concerns, however, are equally important. If consumers are sub-
ject to unfair trade practices, they will be less likely to take advantage of
insurance benefits. Consequently, the industry will neither achieve the
growth, nor fulfill the role, that the government envisions for it within
the national economy.
The Model Act provides a guide for incorporating unfair trade provi-
sions into revised Chinese insurance laws. Other Asian legal systems
lack provisions from which the Chinese could learn. Furthermore, the
Chinese are already looking to American industry practices for reform in
the financial services arena and the insurance industry. The Model Act
provides examples of unfair trade practices and methods of enforcement
consistent with China's goals of insurance regulation, as well as its cul-
tural practices.
While such regulations would impose restrictions on both domestic
and foreign companies, they do not present a barrier to market expan-
sion. Far from creating an impediment to American insurers, they are
simply a new application of old and familiar ideas. With respect to insur-
ers from other nations, the regulations are both fair and rational. Their
restrictions would hardly cause concern when weighed against the poten-
tial benefits of tapping into the expansive Chinese insurance market.
Based on these considerations, creating unfair trade provisions similar
to the NAIC Model Act would be a rational exercise of state regulatory
power. Such legislation would further consumer interests. It also would
facilitate China's effort to attract foreign capital and expertise to its de-
veloping insurance industry. Finally, adapting American concepts to
350. Michael Elliott, Swordless in Seattle, Newsweek, Nov. 22, 1993, at 36.
351. See Bill Powell, The Coming Power Struggle, Newsweek, Nov. 22, 1993, at 40.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 7-14.
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China's domestic law would manifest once again China's oft-repeated de-
sire to achieve faster and better results in its programs by "mak[ing] for-
eign things serve China." '353
353. Kleinberg, supra note 65, at 27.

